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INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing demand for water in the industrial and 
residential sectors and increased concerns for 
environmental quality combined with limited water 
supply augmentation have raised water scarcity issues 
and led policymakers to consider policies that enhance 
water use efficiency.  Most water reforms aim to reduce 
the demand of the agricultural sector, which is the 
largest user.  These efforts include water pricing (see 
Tsur & Dinar, 1997; Boggess, Lacewell, & Zilberman, 
1993); water markets (see Kaiser & McFarl, 1997, for a 
survey); and trade mechanisms (Brill, Hochman, & 
Zilberman, 1997).  Strong political lobbying and the need 
to maintain independent domestic food production have 
led policymakers to direct conservational efforts in the 
urban residential sector. The capacity to conserve water 
by raising residential water prices is limited as urban 
water prices are already high and the elasticity of 
demand is low.  Thus, there is a need to increase 
voluntary water conservation through education.  
Educational efforts may include a campaign to 
encourage installation of water conservation devices 
and more responsible use of water in gardening, 
washing, and other activities.  
 
Reported residential water savings attributed to past 
conservation campaigns fall in the range of one to five 
percent.  Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf (1999) 
report a one to four percent saving in 12 cities in the 
United States, and the Israeli Water Authority reported a 
one to five percent saving in 1997 to 2000.  Although 
these numbers are substantial, little is known about the 
extent that education can further reduce water usage, 
which affects public campaigns aimed at “de-marketing” 
or “un-selling” a product.   
 
This paper aims to analyze the motivation for choosing 
advertising as a tool to reduce household consumption 
of water and to empirically document its effect based on 
a survey conducted in Israel. 
 
To understand voluntary conservation, we use theories 
that address issues of fairness and labor effort allocation 
within groups.  We incorporate these theories and 
marketing theories to develop a model to explain water 
conservation.  We empirically test the framework using a 
survey done in Israel.  Major findings are that, on 
average, the stated willingness to conserve was about 
15 percent and that the fairness theorem holds; i.e., 
individuals’ willingness to voluntarily conserve water 
decreases with economic incentives taken by the 
government.   
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Water is one of the market goods used to produce 
household commodities and it is also consumed as a 
final commodity.  Consumers need a minimum quantity 
of water.  It is common to model the demand for water 
using the Stone-Geary utility function in either the 
Cobb-Douglas, linear, or log-log forms (see, for example, 
Hanemann, 1997; Becker, Zeitouni, & Zilberman, 2000).  
This form of demand ignores education and 
conservation activities.  A key factor in modeling water 
conservation activities is that the consumer needs to 
care about the community; i.e., he or she gains from the 
benefits of the community.  The issue of low 
participation in public projects (Dawes & Thaler, 1988) is 
a focal element in education strategy.  
 
The act of giving up your own benefit to help others is 
usually referred as to altruism or pro-social behavior 
(Schwartz, 1997; Baston & Shaw, 1991; Price, Feick, & 
Guskey, 1995).  (The translation of social responsibility 
to economic behavior is done by adding the attitude 
toward the policy or the community to the utility 
function (Train, McFadden, & Goett, 1987; Rabin, 1993)).  
Rabin argued that his fairness model applies to altruism 
and labor efforts.  
 
Labor economists analyzed situations where the 
individual’s efforts contribute to the collective but incur 
personal cost. The motivation to cooperate comes from 
adding a share of the collective earnings to the personal 
income.  A worker needs to allocate his efforts between 
his own business (farm) and working for the collective. 
The collective member’s evaluation of others’ efforts 
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affects his own contribution to the collective efforts  
(Bonin, 1977; Parliament, Tsur, & Zilberman, 1989).  
There is some tradeoff between water and time in the 
production of commodities.  For example, a car can be 
washed using an irrigation pipe, which wastes much 
water but is done easily and quickly; or water can be 
supplied in buckets, which conserves water but is costly 
in terms of time.  
 
Schwartz (1977) and Osterhus (1997) argue that 
consumer choice is moderated by social norms and the 
individual’s need to meet those norms.  Schwartz’s 
(1977) altruism model addresses both social and 
personal norms, where the personal (subjective) norms 
affect the influence of the social norms on the 
individual’s behavior.  Osterhus (1997) models strategies 
that are used to induce contribution to the others, and 
he uses the term pro-social activity.  He distinguishes 
between economic incentives (prices and rewards), 
normative influence (social and individual norm and their 
interaction), and structural factors (mediators of the 
interaction between social and personal norms, such as 
visibility). Osterhus (1997) found that the effect of social 
norms on consumption is mediated by factors such as 
responsibility and trust. A low feeling of responsibility 
and low trust in the actions of the advertiser may cause 
a weak linkage between social normative behavior and 
individual consumption. Visibility of personal actions is 
a key structural factor mediating the translation of social 
norms to personal behavior. Environmentalism and in-
house water-conservation behavior are by definition 
almost invisible; thus, social norms should be 
operationalized by generating a high sense of personal 
responsibility and involvement, and by demonstrating 
the consequences of non-social behavior.  
 
The above discussion suggests that water conservation 
norm is a translation of social and personal norms.  It is a 
function of the gap between the two and the price of 
behaving differently from others, and it increases with 
levels of observability and responsibility.  Suppose that 
there are j individuals in a certain society.  Let S  
represent the personal water conservation norm, 
S = Sjjå  is the society’s norm, r  is the marginal 
price of deviation from social norms, and level of 
observability and responsibility are k 1 and k 2 , 
respectively.  Personal social norm before advertisement 
is:  
 
S0 = f k1,k2 , r, S ( )                                             (1) 
 
Social norms are updated by education (advertisement), 
A, and comparing one’s actions to the actions of others. 
The latter may operate the social justice adjustment 
mechanism; i.e., one’s feeling that the burden is 
allocated fairly and that others contribute their share.  
This is often a moderate factor in multi-player 
cooperative decisions and outcome (see Akelof, 1982; 
Thaler, 1985; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; & 
Rabin, 1993).  Advertising is used in this case to 
educate; i.e., change social norms.  This suggests that 
initial perception of social norms is updated by 
educational advertisement activities and observing the 
behavior of others:  
 
S = S0 + g(A) + k1 j S jå ;.                                  (2) 
 
Personal responsibility decreases if an individual feels 
that his/her actions will not affect the outcome.  Thus, if 
one thinks that the government will do the job, he/she 
will probably be more passive.  The fairness model 
suggests that if the government will reduce public water 
consumption then consumers may feel that it is only fair 
to contribute their share; 
 
¶k2
¶G
> 0 (G is government action).   
If water prices increase, then consumers may think that 
they are already doing their share.  
 
Incorporating the concept of fairness or benefit from 
others utility, family production function framework into 
the individual’s utility, yields the consumer’s 
maximization problem: 
 
MaxSW U(Qi , t0 ,S)                                               (3) 
 
subject to: 
 
Qi = f (Yi , ti ,Wi )
PwW + PyY £ I + ztw
t0 + tw + ts £ T
 
 
where SW is the intensity of water conservation, 
0 £ SW < 1, S is social norms, W
 is defined as the 
quantity of water consumed, Y is other market goods, t0 
is leisure time; z is the hourly wage, t0  is leisure, tw is 
time spent on work, and ts  is the leisure time spent to 
save water.  I is the initial endowment, Pw is the price of 
one unit of water, Py is the price of other market goods, 
and T is the effective time constraint.  
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Solution of the consumer’s maximization problem yields 
that the optimal saving is: 
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The left-hand side is the marginal loss from reduction of 
leisure time as water consumption increases and the 
right-hand side is the increase in marginal utility from 
consumption of other products (as consumers save 
water) plus the increase in social benefit.    
 
The desired reduction in household water consumption 
can be achieved by increasing the price of the water, Pw 
or increasing both social norms and responsibility. The 
relative effectiveness of price and manipulation of 
personal norms is determined by the ratio between r  
and d .  Key factors in voluntary conservation are those 
variables that affect the formation of personal norms and 
its translation to conservation.   
 
Our model assumes that personal responsibility will 
decrease if it appears that somebody else (government) 
will do the job, or if price increases and administrative 
measures have already been imposed on the individual 
or consumers think they should be imposed. As already 
mentioned, social justice (i.e., ones feeling that the 
burden has been fairly allocated) is often a moderating 
factor in multi-player cooperative decisions and 
outcome. Thus, it is expected that consumers who 
support water price increases to other sectors will be 
more willing to voluntarily save water. 
 
H1:  The consumer’s willingness to save water (via 
active measures) increases with his/her feelings that 
other sectors will also engage in water-conserving 
activities.  
 
The translation of social norm to personal responsibility 
is mediated by personal characteristics.  Women have 
been found to care more about the environment than 
men (Ottman, 1993).  Since water conservation has many 
similar aspects with environmentalism, women are 
expected to show higher willingness to save water.  Age 
was found to have a positive impact on conservation 
(Neiswiadany, 1992). 
 
H2: Women’s willingness to conserve water will be 
higher than men’s. 
H3: Willingness to save increases with age. 
BACKGROUND:  ISRAEL’S WATER CRISES 
In 1999, after a very arid winter, the Israeli Water 
Authority decreased the quantity of water allocated for 
agricultural usage by 250 million m3 (a reduction of 40 
percent from 1998).  The Ministry of Agriculture  (1999) 
allocated the quantity that needed to be saved among 
the different crops using a lexicographic decision rule; 
i.e., first minimizing long-term damage to the produce 
and then allocating based on the marginal value of 
production. For example, water allocation for cotton and 
wheat irrigation was reduced by 100 percent; for 
vegetables, including potatoes, by 30 percent; and for 
fruits, including citrus, by 20 percent.  The Ministry of 
Agriculture demanded that farmers be compensated for 
the reduction in water usage by 1 NIS (about $0.25) per 
m3. The political instability that characterized the Israeli 
Parliament and a lack of agreement between the Treasury 
and the Agricultural Ministry led to delays in 
announcing the new water quotas.  These went into 
effect in May 1999 and by then it was too late for many 
farmers to follow the official guidelines.  Thus, the actual 
agricultural sector reduced the amount of water used by 
only 29 percent.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture conditioned its future 
agreement for further reductions in water supply by 
applying similar water-saving steps to both the 
industrial and private sectors (household 
consumption)1. One of the demands imposed by the 
Ministry was to increase the price of water supplied to 
municipal authorities, the suppliers of water to the urban 
sector. Increasing the price to households may have a 
“positive” moral effect on feelings of social justice, but 
its effect on reducing demand is very low as households 
price elasticity is stiff.  The period between 2000 and the 
beginning of 2001 did not improve the water balance 
situation in Israel.  In January 2001, only 30 million m3 of 
water had been added to Lake Kinneret (the only water 
reservoir in Israel) instead of the 80 average million m3.  
It is anticipated that by the end of 2001, the water level 
in Lake Kinneret will continue to decline to –214.32, 
below the red line level set at –213 m (the red line 
designates the lowest level of water the reservoir can 
hold; thus, water should instead be pumped from other, 
as yet unavailable, resources).   
 
WATER RESOURCES IN ISRAEL:  TRENDS AND 
POLICIES 
 
The demand for water in Israel has increased due to the 
sharp rise in population caused by immigration3 and a 
natural growth; that is why the supply has never caught 
up.  Water supply in Israel depends solely on rain. 
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Sequential dry years and over-pumping further 
accelerated the existing water crisis.  If and when a peace 
agreement is signed among Israel, Lebanon, and the 
Palestinians, water scarcity is expected to dramatically 
increase.4  In 1998, the demand for water was higher than 
its supply by 212 million m3, in 1999 the excess demand 
had increased to 317 million m3; and in 2000 ground 
water was overexploited by 350 million m3. 
 
 
REGULATIONS, PRICES, AND ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 
Water quantities and usage are determined by 
administrative allocations and processes, both 
monitored by the water director with the authority of the 
1959 water law.  Each year the Water Authority 
determines water allocation to the different sectors 
(agricultural, industrial, and municipal) for the coming 
year. Water suppliers are constrained to these 
allocations in their extraction permits (Kislev & Rosental, 
1999).    
 
The price of water for the farmer does not depend on 
his/her location, although production prices depend on 
distance from the water source.  However, it does vary 
as a function of usage. Farmers pay about $0.18 per m3 
for the first 50 percent of their water allocation, $0.22 for 
the next 30 percent, and $0.29 for the last 20 percent.  
Industries pay about $0.22-$0.25, and individuals pay on 
average $1.00 per cubic foot.  The price of water for 
agriculture has not changed much since the year of 
Israel’s independence (1948) until the mid-1970s.  In 1973 
the price of water to agriculture was raised by about 5 
percent, and in 1976 prices were raised by an additional 
26 percent, a price level that stayed fixed until 1980. At 
that point, prices rose again by about 20 percent, and 
then decreased to their former level until 1986 when the 
water allocation for agricultural usage was reduced by 10 
percent.  In 1990 prices rose to high levels, and in 1991 
the price of water for agricultural usage increased again 
by about 24 percent.  
 
The price of water allocated to agriculture increased in 
1986, and the reduction in quantity decreased the 
agricultural sector demand by 28 percent (16.4 percent in 
addition to the administrative steps). Concomitant to the 
pricing and administrative measures, the Water 
Authority launched an advertising campaign aimed at 
encouraging water conservation. The public response to 
the 1986 campaign was minor, and household 
consumption went down only 6 percent (Kislev & 
Vacsin, 1997).  In 1991, the agricultural sector’s demand 
decreased by 23 percent, and the households’ response 
to the advertisements was 5 percent.  The public 
response to the 2000 campaign was an estimated 10 
percent saving (Mkorot Spokesperson).   
 
In 2001, the Water Authority, the Treasury, and the 
Agricultural Ministry agreed that the quantity allocated 
to agricultural usage from the available drinking-quality 
water would be reduced by 50 percent (available 
quantity of 450-490 million m3, down from the long-term 
average of 980-1000 million m3).  A paper presented in 
September 2000 by the R&D authority forecasted that in 
a steady state the water supply would stand at around 
530 million m3.  The direct annual damage to the 
economy from cutting back the water supply to 
agricultural usage is anticipated to be about 2.0 billion 
NIS ($0.5 billion US). In 2000, there were 0.2 million 
irrigated hectares; after implementation of the new 
policy, the Israeli agricultural sector will lose 0.05 million 
hectares,5 9,000 hectares of orchards will be uprooted, 
and 15,800 employees will be out of work.6   
 
In addition to these administrative steps, the Water 
Authority decided to launch an advertising campaign 
aimed at educating and encouraging water conservation 
in December 2000.  The slogan of the campaign was:  
“Don’t let the winter  ‘fool’ you; there is a still a water 
shortage—please conserve.”  The television ads 
showed everyday scenes where a parent wasted water 
(not turning off the faucet while shaving, watering the 
garden in the middle of the day, or answering the phone 
while running the water in the kitchen), and a child 
preaching to his parents about wasting water and 
reminding them to turn off the faucet when not in use.  
These types of ads showed individuals different ways to 
save water and stressed their personal responsibility to 
help ease the water shortage.  The previous year’s 
campaign, which was less effective, used a “sad baby” 
concept showing various scenes of an arid, dried-up 
environment.   
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
The Survey 
 
In January 2001 we surveyed 197 Israelis.  Respondents 
consisted of 140 undergraduate economic students from 
two universities (Haifa University and the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem) and 57 employees of the 
Hebrew University. This was a nonrepresentative 
survey; however, since it was aimed at measuring the 
effect of the advertising campaign and using gender and 
the tradeoff between active and passive measures to 
explain the magnitude of the conservation, sample 
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choice is not expected to harm the validity of the 
results.7  Respondents were asked whether or not they 
remembered the latest water conservation campaign.  
They were asked whether or not the ads encouraged 
them to save water and then to estimate how much they 
actually saved (in percent).  The final question was:  
What policy was the most effective in inducing water 
conservation (increase price for household, increase 
price for agriculture, stop watering public gardens, use 
social advertising, or increase supply)?  
 
Survey Results 
 
Most of the 197 respondents (93.91 percent) remembered 
the water conservation campaign.  In general, most of 
the Israelis (72.59 percent) complied with the challenge 
of saving more water, whereas only 25 percent (3) of 
those who did not see the campaign thought they would 
save water; 75.6 percent (143 responders) were willing to 
save water after being exposed to the campaign. Thus, in 
this instance, the pro-social advertising campaign 
achieved its purpose.  The average saving was 15 
percent.  The declared figures are to be treated with 
caution, as there is always a gap between declared 
willingness to pay (act) and the actual one (see Berk et 
al., 1993).  
 
Most of the respondents (60 percent) thought that 
conservation should be undertaken by others; i.e., 
increase the price of water used in agriculture, stop 
watering public gardens, or use advertising.  However, 
the fact that 40 percent agreed to an increase in the price 
of water for household usage supports the 
government’s policy. 
 
We estimated the effect of personal variables and 
fairness measures using the following estimation:  
 
Sw = a+ b1Age+ b2Gender+ b3Income+ b4 fairenessindex 
 
Where Sw is the declared intensity of savings.  Fairness 
is measured by an individual’s acceptance of a certain 
policy measure:   
 
1.  Increase household price 
2.  Increase agricultural price 
3.  Stop watering public gardens 
4.  Advertise 
5.  Augment water supply.  
 
Since the government is asking the public to save water, 
then it is expected that willingness to save increases 
with policies number 3 and 5 and decreases relative to 
the other policies.  The results of the empirical model are 
given in Table 1 below.   
 
 
Table 1:  Estimating Main and Cross Effects of Age, Gender, Income, and Preferred Policy on the Intensity of 
Conservation. 
 
Parameter B Std. Error t Sig. 
Intercept 73.6477064 14.85507 4.95775 2.07E-06
Intercept -0.281396 0.175342 -1.60484 0.110831
AGE -64.92443 21.31845 -3.04546 0.002787
Man -51.79651 17.23077 -3.00605 0.003149
INCOME=Low  -57.196977 14.41215 -3.96866 0.000116
INCOME=Medium 54.8667493 25.58474 2.144511 0.033757
Recommended Policy:  
   Increase household price -54.743794 15.76996 -3.4714 0.000693
   Increase price for agriculture 19.5671339 12.59201 1.553933 0.122508
   Stop watering public gardens -45.281396 17.22608 -2.62865 0.009551
   Use advertis ement  -35.712339 14.84468 -2.40573 0.017475
   Increase Supply of water 0  
R2  square = 0.248 
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These results suggest that: 
 
1.  Women responded better to the campaign than men; 
i.e., their willingness to save water after the 
campaign was significantly higher than the men’s. 
Women increased the probability of saving by 58 
percent.  
2. Younger individuals responded better to the 
conservation campaign.  Each additional year 
showed a decrease of 0.3 percent in water 
conservation. 
3. Individuals with high incomes are willing to save 
more than low- or medium-income individuals.  
4. The theories of fairness and effort allocation within 
groups, which argue that personal efforts are 
affected by others’ action, were strongly supported.  
The willingness to save sharply declines when 
economic incentives are used.  It increases when 
the public sector does voluntary water-saving 
activities such as no watering of public gardens.  
5. There is a tradeoff between a price increase and 
voluntary conservation.   
 
Long-Term Effects 
 
Long-term commitment was measured as the percent of 
respondents who would continue to save water after the 
advertising campaign ends. Only 38.1 percent of the 
respondents thought that they would continue to save 
water. There were no significant relationships between 
long-term commitment and any of the socio-
demographic explanatory variables; however, a higher 
intensity of saving during the campaign was a good 
indictor of long-term commitment.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Advertisements can be an effective way to encourage 
water conservation.  The average declared willingness to 
save is 15 percent.  This is higher than the targeted 10 
percent that the household sector was expected to reach 
after imposing many unpleasant measures, including 
doubling the price of water, mandatory installation of 
water-saving instruments, and issuing fines to anyone 
caught watering his/her garden during the day. Without 
knowing how long their willingness to conserve would 
last, it is impossible to estimate its efficiency relative to 
other measures taking into account that its cost was 
about $2.5 million.  
 
We show empirically that advertisement works and that 
the feelings of responsibility that mediate the 
advertising’s effect are a function of passive versus 
active action and the feeling of social justice. In 
particular, we found that the willingness to save 
increases with governmental conservation efforts and 
supply augmentation, and decreases with a price 
increase.   
 
Our study found that women were found to be more 
responsive to the advertisement campaign, wealthier 
individuals cared more about the environment than 
others, and mature respondents showed a higher 
willingness to save.  This may suggest that 
advertisements should be targeted more towards women 
by appealing to their sense of responsibility. 
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End Notes: 
 
1 “Water Usage in Agriculture and the Rural Sector,” a 
special economic report on the situation of the 
agricultural and the rural sectors. Prepared by the 
Department of Research Development, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, July 1999, Ch 2.2.6.   
2 See Rinat (2001). 
3 More than 1 million Russian Jewish immigrants during 
the 80s (20 percent increase in the population in three 
years) and a steady immigration rate of 60,000 (1 percent) 
per year in the following years. 
4 In his book “Rivers of Fire: The Conflict of Water in the 
Middle East,” Arnon Sofer (1992) argues that the water 
shortage in the Middle East will cause a war between 
Arabs and Israelis.   
5 One of the informal benefits of agriculture is that it 
occupies and signal rights on land. Given that a final 
agreement about the borders of and ownership rights 
between Israel and the Palestinians hasn’t yet been 
signed, stopping to farmland could have a serious 
political impact.     
6 The R&D department (September 20, 2000) report 
submitted to the general manager of the Agricultural 
Ministry. 
7 We compared results from the student group with 
those obtained from the university employees, a more 
representative group, and found no significant 
differences in any of our analyses.    
